British-German Relations, 1919-1939

Tasks:

1. Fill in the worksheet (see separate pdf-document):
   a. Give definitions for the events.
   b. Give a definition of appeasement policy as well.
   c. Decide whether the events contributed to improving (オス) or to deteriorating (梟) British-German relations and fill in the respective box with reasons.

Sources:
- Kitson, pp.227-236
- Horizonte, pp.322-324
- S1

2. Against the backdrop of your results, answer key questions no.1 in your Advance Organizer:
   How did the British attitude towards the Treaty of Versailles affect Anglo-German relations and in how far did Hitler profit from this?

3. Fill in S2 and evaluate in how far Nazi foreign policy can be labelled “Janus-faced”.

Sources:
- Kitson + Horizonte (see above)
- S2

4. Now give a balanced assessment of the second key question in your Advance Organizer:
   Is it justified to claim that appeasement contributed to a large extent to the outbreak of WWII?

Sources:
- Kitson, esp. p.235: “Stepping Stones to Glory” (cartoon by David Low) + Horizonte (see above)
- S3

Extra Task: Make yourself familiar with both the tasks as well as the marking sheet for this year’s Zentralabitur cartoon (sent to you via email topic: appeasement).
The Munich Agreement (Munich Pact); 29 September 1938

Agreement concluded at Munich, September 29, 1938, between Germany, Great Britain, France and Italy

GERMANY, the United Kingdom, France and Italy, taking into consideration the agreement, which has been already reached in principle for the cession to Germany of the Sudeten German territory, have agreed on the following terms and conditions governing the said cession and the measures consequent thereon, and by this agreement they each hold themselves responsible for the steps necessary to secure its fulfilment:

(1) The evacuation will begin on 1st October.
(2) The United Kingdom, France and Italy agree that the evacuation of the territory shall be completed by the 10th October, without any existing installations having been destroyed, and that the Czechoslovak Government will be held responsible for carrying out the evacuation without damage to the said installations. [...] 
(5) [An] international commission [...] will determine the territories in which a plebiscite is to be held. These territories will be occupied by international bodies until the plebiscite has been completed. The same commission will fix the conditions in which the plebiscite is to be held, taking as a basis the conditions of the Saar plebiscite. The commission will also fix a date, not later than the end of November, on which the plebiscite will be held.
(6) The final determination of the frontiers will be carried out by the international commission. The commission will also be entitled to recommend to the four Powers, Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Italy, in certain exceptional cases, minor modifications in the strictly ethnographical determination of the zones which are to be transferred without plebiscite.
(7) There will be a right of option into and out of the transferred territories, the option to be exercised within six months from the date of this agreement. A German-Czechoslovak commission shall determine the details of the option, consider ways of facilitating the transfer of population and settle questions of principle arising out of the said transfer.
(8) The Czechoslovak Government will within a period of four weeks from the date of this agreement release from their military and police forces any Sudeten Germans who may wish to be released, and the Czechoslovak Government will within the same period release Sudeten German prisoners who are serving terms of imprisonment for political offences.

Munich, September 29, 1938.

ADOLF HITLER, NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN, EDOUARD DALADIER, BENITO MUSSOLINI.
### Nazi Foreign Policy

**Hitler’s aims**
- revision of the Treaty of Versailles
- formation of a “Greater German Empire”
- creation of “living space” in the east

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>Hitler’s Speech of Peace; Concordat with the Holy See</td>
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<tr>
<td>1934</td>
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**Policy of accomplished facts (fait accompli)**

**Road to War**
- road to war

**Janus-faced foreign policy**

**Affirmations of peace**
Hitler had been contemptuous of the western powers before the taking of Prague. He correctly judged that once more they would protest, but do nothing. However, everything points to the conclusion that he miscalculated the response of Britain and France after the invasion of Czecho-Slovakia. The initial reaction in London was one of shock and dismay at the cynical demolition of the Munich Agreement, despite the warnings the British government had received. Appeasement policy lay shattered in the ruins of the Czecho-Slovakian state. Hitler had broken his promise that he had no further territorial demands to make. And the conquest of Czecho-Slovakia had destroyed the fiction that Hitler’s policies were aimed at the uniting of German peoples in a single state. Hitler, it was now abundantly clear – a recognition at last and very late in the day – could not be trusted. He would stop at nothing. Chamberlain’s speech in Birmingham on 17 March hinted at a new policy. ‘Is this the last attack upon a small State, or is it to be followed by others?’ he asked. ‘Is this, in fact, a step in the direction of an attempt to dominate the world by force?’ British public opinion was in no doubt. Hitler had united a country deeply divided over Munich. On all sides people were saying that war with Germany was both inevitable and necessary. Recruitments for the armed forces increased almost overnight. It was now clear both to the man in the street and to the government: Hitler had to be tackled.

The old policy of trying to come to terms with the dictatorships on the assumption that they had limited war aims was no longer possible. Chamberlain regarded his Birmingham speech, he told the cabinet, ‘as a challenge to Germany on the issue whether or not Germany intended to dominate Europe by force. It followed that if Germany took another step in the direction of dominating Europe, she would be accepting the challenge.’ Lord Halifax, the Foreign Secretary, underlined the view that ‘the real issue was Germany’s attempt to obtain world domination, which it was in the interest of all countries to resist’. […]

The policy had shifted from trying to appease Hitler to attempting to deter him. In any new aggression, Germany would be faced at the outset with the choice of pulling back or going to war. As the Foreign Secretary’s comments made clear, the geographical thrust of any new move by Hitler was immaterial to this new strategy. But the Prime Minister had little doubt as to where the trouble might next flare up. ‘He thought that Poland was very likely the key to the situation … The time had now come for those who were threatened by German aggression (whether immediately or ultimately) to get together. We should enquire how far Poland was prepared to go along these lines.’ The British Guarantee to Poland and the genesis of the summer crisis which, this time, would end in war were foreshadowed in Chamberlain’s remarks.

Similar reactions were registered in Paris. Daladier let Chamberlain know that the French would speed up rearmament and resist any further aggression. The Americans were told that Daladier was determined to go to war should the Germans act against Danzig or Poland. Even strong advocates of appeasement were now saying enough was enough; there would not be another Munich.